

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 DRC-01 /068 W

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O R 180815Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0513

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0325

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF AD HOC GROUP MEETING  
OF OCTOBER 16, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT ITS OCT 16 MEETING, CHAIRED BY  
THE LUXEMBOURG REP (WINTER), THE AD HOC GROUP (AHG)  
DISCUSSED THE OCT 15 INFORMAL SESSION (MBFR VIENNA  
323), PARTICULARLY THE EASTERN "INITIAL REDUCTION"  
PROPOSAL, AND THE KIND OF RESPONSE THE ALLIES SHOULD  
MAKE TO IT. THE GROUP CONCLUDED THAT, IN SUBSTANCE,  
THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL VERY CLOSELY RESEMBLED  
THE "SYMBOLIC REDUCTION" IDEA AND "FIRST STEP" PRO-  
POSAL ADVANCED BY THE EAST DURING THE SECOND AND

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THIRD ROUNDS. THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THE

APPROPRIATE ALLIED RESPONSE AT THE OCT 22 INFORMAL WOULD BE TO SAY THAT "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL AS ONLY FORMALIZATION OF EARLIER IDEAS, THAT WEST HAD SINCE THEN MADE 2 OR 3 NEW MOVES, AND TO REPEAT STANDARD WESTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WHILE PICKING OUT THE POSITIVE POINTS ABOUT US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS. ALLIES ALSO WOULD COMMENT NEGATIVELY REGARDING EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTION ELEMENT BUT THEN RETURN QUICKLY TO "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE IN ORDER TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF METHOD OF REDUCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. US REP OPENED DISCUSSION OF OCT 15 INFORMAL BY EXPLAINING THE LACK OF EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE ALLIED PRESENTATION ON GROUND FORCE REDEFINITION. HE SAID THAT BY THE TIME HE HAD FINISHED THE PRESENTATION, IT WAS ALMOST NOON AND SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV) WAS VISIBLY ANXIOUS TO GIVE HIS STATEMENT ON THE "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL BEFORE LEAVING FOR A LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT. THIS AND THE INHERENT COMPLEXITY OF THE ALLIED PRESENTATION EXPLAINED THE LACK OF EASTERN REACTION. HOWEVER, KHLESTOV TOOK CAREFUL WORD BY WORD NOTES OF THE ALLIED PRESENTATION.

3. US REP NOTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD STRESSED THE FORMAL CHARACTER OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AND HAD REQUESTED THE ALLIES TO PROVIDE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE AT THE OCT 22 INFORMAL. ALLIED REPS THEREFORE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO A PRELIMINARY REACTION, BASED ON AHG CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS. US REP SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP DISCUSS THE RESPONSE TO BE MADE ON OCT 22.

4. BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) NOTED A NUMBER OF INTERESTING POINTS ABOUT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL, INCLUDING THE SEPARATION OF US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS FROM REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH GAVE A CERTAIN CREDIBILITY TO THE ALLIED PHASING CONCEPT. HE OBSERVED THAT THE EAST WAS MAKING THIS MOVE AT A TIME WHEN MOVEMENT IS BECOMING PERCEPTIBLE IN CSCE, AND JUST BEFORE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. ADRIAENSSEN ALSO NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROPOSAL SINGLES OUT THE FRG AND IS CONTRARY TO THE IDEA OF  
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GLOBAL CEILINGS, AND IS THUS "UNACCEPTABLE" ON THIS SCORE. HE THOUGHT THE ALLIES MIGHT, IN SEEKING TO LEAD DISCUSSION TO THE COMMON CEILING, TRY TO EXPLOIT THE POINT IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT THE INITIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING FURTHER, SUBSTANTIVE REDUCTIONS (MBFR VIENNA 323 PARA 4E).

5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY CANADIAN REP (GRANDE),

US DEPREP EXPLAINED THAT KHLESTOV DID NOT SPECIFICALLY

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L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 DRC-01 /068 W  
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O R 180815Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0514

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0325

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

MENTION REDUCTIONS OF "AIR FORCE UNITS AND THOSE ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS" IN HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL. THE FORMAL EASTERN PRESENTATION REFERRED TO REDUCTIONS OF 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE, "TOGETHER WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING ARMS AND EQUIPMENT." KHLESTOV'S REFERENCE TO AIR FORCE UNITS AND THOSE ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS MADE ONLY IN RESPONSE TO A LATER QUESTION FROM BELGIAN REP.

6. UK REP (ROSE) SAID THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL CONTAINED POSITIVE POINTS BUT THAT NEGATIVE ASPECTS MADE IT UNACCEPTABLE. ROSE SAID THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACT WAS, THAT THIS WAS DECLARED BY THE EAST TO BE A FORMAL

PROPOSAL OF THE FOUR EASTERN GOVERNMENTS AND, AS SUCH,  
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SHOULD BE HANDLED DIFFERENTLY BY THE ALLIES THAN WHEN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL WAS PUT FORWARD LAST ROUND ON AN INCREMENTAL AND UNOFFICIAL BASIS. KHLESTOV HAD REPUDIATED THESE IDEAS WHEN THE ALLIES HAD TRIED TO SUMMARIZE THEM AT THE JULY 10 INFORMAL SESSION; NOW THE EAST HAD PRESENTED THEIR OWN PACKAGE, AND AN OFFICIAL ONE AT THAT. ROSE SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER THE EASTERN NEGOTIATING PURPOSE IN TABLING THE PROPOSAL NOW. HE THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE APPEARANCE OF THE PROPOSAL IN PLENARY SESSION AND THEREAFTER IN A BRIEFING TO THE PRESS.

7. ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI) AGREED THAT THE ALLIES NEEDED TO BE PREPARED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IMMINENT EASTERN PRESS BRIEFING IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE EAST FROM INFLUENCING THE UNINFORMED PUBLIC. CAGIATI ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES NO LONGER SHOULD ARGUE THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD "PERPETUATE" EXISTING DISPARITIES, BUT INSTEAD SHOULD POINT OUT THAT IT WOULD "INCREASE THE DISPARITIES. CAGIATI NOTED THAT IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT DURING THE THIRD ROUND, THE EAST HAD HINTED THAT THE "BULK" OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS COULD BE TAKEN BY THE US AND USSR. UNDER THE NEW PROPOSAL, THE US AND USSR WOULD TAKE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE TOTAL REDUCTION, WHICH WAS A STEP BACKWARD. HAVING COMPARED THE "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL WITH THE EASTERN "FIRST STEP" PROPOSAL OF THE THIRD ROUND, AS SUMMARIZED BY EX-NETHERLANDS REP QUARLES AT THE JULY 10 INFORMAL (MBFR VIENNA 154 AND 156), CAGIATI THOUGHT THE NEW PROPOSAL WAS WORSE THAN THE ALLIES HAD EXPECTED AND EVEN MORE UNACCEPTABLE.

8. FRG ACTING REP (HOFMANN) COMMENTED THAT IN COMPARING THE EASTERN NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL, THE "SYMBOLIC REDUCTION" PROPOSAL OF THE SECOND ROUND, THE "FIRST-STEP" PROPOSAL OF THE THIRD ROUND, AND THE NEW "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL, THE EAST SEEMED EXCEPT ON DETAILS TO HAVE MOVED BACKWARD. HOFMANN NOTED THAT, IN THE FIRST-STEP IDEA, THERE WAS THE SUGGESTION OF GLOBAL CEILINGS, OF DEFERRAL OF NUCLEAR AND ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, AND OF  
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LUXEMBOURG AS AN EXCEPTION TO REDUCTIONS; ALL OF THESE POSITIVE POINTS WERE MISSING FROM THE CURRENT PROPOSAL. NOTING THAT THE EAST HAD PAIRED THE FRG AND POLAND, HOFMANN COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE A BAD IDEA IF THE EAST MEANT THAT THE FRG AND POLAND WOULD UNDERTAKE REDUCTIONS OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDE. HOWEVER, IF SINGLING OUT OF THE FRG AND POLAND WAS INVOLVED, IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE ALLIED REQUIREMENT FOR GLOBAL CEILINGS. AS INDICATED BY THE ALL-PARTICIPANTS OFFER, REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN BY FRG FORCES TOWARD THE COMMON CEILING, BUT THERE MUST BE NO NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.

9. HOFMANN COMMENTED THAT THE FACT THE PROPOSAL IS A FORMAL ONE MAY BE A DISADVANTAGE SINCE IT MEANS THE EAST MAY BE HARDER TO MOVE FROM FORMAL POSITIONS.

10. US REP SAID HE HAD NOTED TWO POSITIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE "INITIAL REDUCTION" AND "FIRST STEP" PROPOSALS. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR FIRST STAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WHILE THE "FIRST STEP" PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR FIRST STAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF WESTERN REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND SOME OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SECONDLY, THE NEW PROPOSAL IS CLEARER ON THE ORDER OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE US AND SOVIETS WOULD IMPLEMENT THEIR REDUCTIONS IN SIX MONTHS (IF PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE), WITH REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO COME THEREAFTER, ALBEIT STILL IN 1975. US REP SUGGESTED THAT THIS ELIMINATES THE ALLIED CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DELAY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS WELL UNDERWAY. US REP THOUGHT THE EAST WAS TRYING TO PLACE THE BURDEN ON THE ALLIES FOR THE NEXT MOVE. THIS BURDEN MIGHT SOON BE ADDED IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA AS WELL.

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ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0325

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. AS TO THE APPROPRIATE ALLIED RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL, US REP SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF FIRST MAKING CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT EASTERN REPS HAD IN SUBSTANCE ONLY FORMALIZED IDEAS ALREADY RAISED INFORMALLY LAST MARCH AND JUNE. SINCE THE TIME WHEN THE EAST BEGAN DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL, THE ALLIES HAD MADE TWO OR THREE SIGNIFICANT MOVES OF THEIR OWN -- THE ALL PARTICIPANTS FORMULA, DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE RE-DEFINITION AND THE 18-MONTH DURATION FOR THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. THEREFORE, THE ALLIES COULD CLAIM THAT IT STILL WAS UP TO THE EAST TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE. THIS TACTIC WOULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A DEFENSIBLE ALLIED PUBLIC POSITION IN THE EVENT THE EAST DID LEAK  
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THEIR PROPOSAL.

12. US REP AGREED WITH THE ITALIAN REP THAT THE ALLIES ALSO SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT ITS EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS EVEN WORSE THAN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS USING THE ENTIRE DATA BASE ON BOTH SIDES. US REP RECALLED THAT THE GROUP DEEMED IT UNWISE TO FOCUS THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE SHAPE OF REDUCTIONS, AS OPPOSED TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES. THEREFORE, HE SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES MIGHT AT THE NEXT INFORMAL SIMPLY STATE THAT EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTIONS IS AN ESPECIALLY UNATTRACTIVE ELEMENT OF THE "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL, AND THEN RETURN TO THE AGREED "WHOSE FORCES" QUESTION.

AT THE SAME TIME, AND ALSO TO MAINTAIN THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS, THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO PICK OUT THE POSITIVE POINTS OF THE "INITIAL REDUCTION" PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY WELCOMING ITS DIFFERENTIATION OF TREATMENT BETWEEN US/SOVIET FORCES AND THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND SEEKING TO BUILD ON THAT STILL INADEQUATE DIFFERENTIATION.

13. THE ITALIAN REP CAUTIONED THAT, AS REGULARLY HAPPENED IN THE PAST, WHENEVER THE ALLIES APPEAR POSITIVE ON A CERTAIN POINT, THE EAST ARGUES THAT ALLIES HAVE ACCEPTED THAT POINT. HENCE, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE TOO GENEROUS IN THEIR SINGLING OUT POSITIVE POINTS IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

14. BALANCE OF REPORT OF OCT 16 AHG MEETING BY AIRGRAM.RESOR

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